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Numerous development economists have expressed concern 
the past several decades about machinery substituting too 
rapidly for labor, especially in rural areas. They have 
often presumed that cheap credit encouraged this by causing 
input price distortions favoring capital use (e.g. Barker, 
p. 144~ Gupta, p. 52; Johnston and Cownie, p. 574~ Lele, p. 
98; Little, Scitovosky and Scott, p. 87; Meier, p. 174; 
Mellor, p. 325; and Shaw, p. 77). Several of these econo-
mists see factor-use distortions as the primary undesirable 
result of cheap credit policies. 
In the following discussion we ignore whether signifi-
cant distortions in factor-use proportions have occurred, 
and whether such distortions are or are not desirable (see: 
Binswanger, Gotsch, Mcinerney and Donaldson, and Saunders). 
Instead, we focus on the extent to which low interest rates 
cause farmers to alter the combinations of productive inputs 
they use. We will conclude that, while low interest rates 
have undesirable effects on rural economies, they have 
negligible effects on factor-use proportions in agriculture. 
We will also argue that distortions in product and input 
prices, and that levels of investment in yield increasing 
research are far more important in determining the com-
binations of inputs chosen by producers. We conclude that 
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attention should be directed to more substantial financial 
market problems such as the effects low interest rates have 
on income distribution, on costs of financial inter-
mediation, on incentives to save, and on the vitality and 
performance of financial institutions. 
Background 
The assertion that cheap credit causes over-investment 
in capital began to surface in development literature in the 
late 1960s. Those raising this argument have done so as if 
it were a well established fact needing little justifica-
tion, amplification, or supporting evidence. While its 
genesis is uncertain, it is consistent with neo-Keyesians' 
stress on the importance of interest rates in determining 
levels of investment. A good deal of confusion is asso-
ciated with this argument because of imprecise use of the 
term 'capital'. Some authors use it to denote working 
capital: funds or claims-on-resources that may be owned or 
borrowed. Others apply the term only to man-made inputs 
that have productive lives spanning several production 
periods, e.g. tractors, tubewells, and buildings. Many 
authors apply the term to both notions: funds and physical 
inputs. In the discussion that follows we apply the term 
'funds' to working capital, including claims-on-resources 
that are borrowed. We restrict our use of the term 
'capital' to physical inputs such as tractors. 
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When a distinction is made between funds and capital it 
is not readily apparent why a change in the price of funds, 
interest rates, should have any differential effect on the 
willingness of producers to use capital inputs. Interest 
rates on funds are one set of prices while the price of 
capital and other factors of production, including labor, 
appear to be independent of these rates. While not expli-
citly stated by authors making the distortion argument, it 
appears they use four assumptions to support this proposi-
tion. The first is that borrowers have "price astigmatism": 
their financial vision is blurred and they end up using some 
combined price of capital and interest rates on loans in 
making capital-use decisions. Second, borrowers have 
"discounting hyperopia" and tend to mimic the interest rates 
set on loans in fixing their individual discount rates. If 
this occurs, and interest rates on loans are low, the 
borrower would be too far sighted and overestimate the 
current value of future benefits from capital use. Third, 
governments and lenders may promote the use of additional 
modern agricultural technology, such as tractors, through 
low interest rates on loans "tied" to the purchase of capi-
tal inputs. This might cause distortions in factor-use pro-
portions to the extent that loans can be effectively tied to 
increased capital use. Fourth, low interest rates may 
result in excess loan demand and induce lenders to con-
centrate cheap credit in large loans to borrowers whose 
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firms use relatively large amounts of capital, compared to 
firms that are more severely credit rationed by lenders. 
Price Astigmatism 
There is often a close association between borrowing 
and capital purchases. There are two reasons for this: 
first, producers often do not have sufficient liquid assets 
to buy large capital items. A major benefit of a well func-
tioning financial market is it allows borrowers to purchase 
large items without having to wait to accumulate sufficient 
savings. Second, lenders are more eager to finance items 
that add to visible collateral than activities that do not. 
While difficult to prove, it is likely that an expansion in 
the volume of loans will increase the amount of capital 
purchased by producers. One must be careful, nevertheless, 
to separate the effect of increased access to loans from the 
effects changes in interest rates might have on capital use. 
One way to do this, in a controlled experiment, would be to 
hold the volume of credit used by a producer constant and 
vary the interest rate paid on loans. The lowest interest 
rate that can be charged is a minus 100 percent, a gift. 
There appears to be no a priori reason why a gift of money 
compared to a loan should induce producers to favor the 
acquisition of one class of inputs, or items of consumption 
for that matter, over another. 
One might argue that because loans and capital acquisi-
tion are often closely associated, that borrowers may become 
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confused about the difference between the price of the loan 
and the price of the capital item: the borrower may have 
financial astigmatism and blur the distinction between these 
two prices. This might result in borrowers making capital-
use decisions largely on the basis of the size of their 
periodic loan repayments and their cash flow. Since the 
size of the loan repayment is a combination of the interest 
rate charged on the loan and the price of the capital item 
purchased, the lower the interest rate the more eager would 
be astigmatic producers to buy the capital input. While 
some producers may make decisions in this manner, it is 
inconsistent with profit maximization behavior. A firm's 
cash flow is not a direct indication of the profitability of 
the use of a capital item. Changes in interest rates on 
loans affect the overall profitability of borrowing firms, 
but they do not change the relative profitability of the 
firm's enterprises and inputs. 
Those making the price astigmatism argument must assume 
a good measure of economic irrationality among producers, 
and that many borrowers who purchase capital items are not 
profit maximizers. They must also implicitly assume that 
borrowers do not confuse the price of labor or the prices of 
other inputs with interest rates when borrowing is asso-
ciated with the purchase of these inputs. Also, it must be 
assumed that the large volume of lending that takes place in 
informal financial markets, often at much higher interest 
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rates than charged in the formal market, does not bias 
borrowers away from capital use. The price astigmatism 
argument does not appear to us to be very robust. 
D1scounting Hyperopia 
Another argument that might be used to justify accusa-
tions that low interest rates distort factor-use might be 
labeled discounting hyperopia. Because the benefits from 
investments in capital items come over several production 
periods, producers must apply discount rates in calculating 
the present value of this stream of benefits. One might 
argue that borrowers tend to mimic the low interest rates on 
formal loans in setting their personal discount rates. This 
would cause borrowers to be too far sighted and to overesti-
mate the present value of future benefits from investments 
in capital inputs by applying too low a discount factor to 
future benefits. 
There are two limitations to this argument. The first 
is that there is no obvious reason to assume that borrowers 
mimic interest rates on formal loans in setting their per-
sonal discount rates. For example, one would not expect a 
70 year old borrower to apply the same discount rate to 
benefits from a capital investment with a 20 year economic 
life that a person 30 years old would use, even though they 
paid the same low rate of interest on formal loans. Also, 
there is no reason to believe that borrowers would inter-
nalize low interest rates on formal loans, especially when 
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those rates were negative in real terms. If mimicked, the 
negative real rates of interest would induce borrowers to 
add a premium to future income, a very doubtful assumption. 
It is also unclear why buyers of capital would select 
the low interest rates applied to formal loans in setting 
their discount rates. Numerous rural producers in low 
income countries have multiple loans from both formal and 
informal sources, or have loans from only informal lenders. 
The explicit and implicit nominal interest rates on these 
loans may range from zero on loans from friends and relati-
ves to reasonably high rates on short term, unsecured, small 
loans from other informal sources. Why would borrowers not 
mimic the zero rates of interest they receive from a loan 
made to brothers-in-law, or high rates of interest paid on 
small informal loans in setting internal discount rates? 
Again, there is no a priori reason why the borrower should 
use any of the rates that exist in financial markets in 
setting highly personal discount rates. The hyperopia argu-
ment appears to have even less vitality to it than the 
astigmatism argument. 
Loan Tying 
Another argument supporting this line of reasoning 
focuses on lender rather than borrower behavior. One might 
argue that borrowers are economically rational, but that 
lenders enforce loan conditions that are not in the 
borrower's best interests. That is, the lender is able to 
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tie the use of the loan to additional purchases of capital. 
The lender may have several reasons for doing this. First, 
as mentioned previously, capital items provide more secure 
collateral than do many other uses of borrower funds. This 
may cause lenders to bias their loans in favor of capital 
over other factors of production. The second reason is that 
lenders might try to promote the acquisition of capital as 
part of government or donor attempts to modernize agri-
culture. Lenders and policy makers may feel that borrowers 
are unable to correctly forecast the benefits of more capi-
tal use and that some measure of carrot (low interest rate 
loans} and stick (tying the loans to capital purchases) is 
required so that private and social benefit-costs are more 
closely attuned. 
At first blush, the tying argument appears to be 
strong. Clearly, many of the loans made by the formal 
financial system in low income countries are justified on 
the basis of the borrower buying capital inputs or making a 
capital improvement. There may or may not, however, be a 
close relationship between the reasons used to justify a 
loan and the changes in uses by the borrower of marginal 
liquidity provided by a loan. One must clearly understand 
fungibility, additionality, diversion, and substitution to 
evaluate the ability of the lender to tie loans. 
The principal reason for people inventing financial 
instruments was because of their interchangeability or 
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fungibility {Von Pischke and Adams}. A unit of money owned 
by a borrower is identical to units of money borrowed, units 
of money received from various sources of income, or funds 
received from sale of assets. Money can be used to purchase 
any good or service available in the market. Once borrowed, 
monies provided by a loan are indistinguishable from other 
funds owned or borrowed by the producer. Because of this, 
one cannot determine a loan's impact on a borrower's pattern 
of expenditures by looking at the justification given for 
obtaining a loan. In many cases, the tying of loans to the 
purchase of specific items is a joint charade played by len-
ders and borrowers to allow policy makers to feel they are 
controlling resource allocation. 
The correct gauge of loan tying is additionality. It 
measures the differences in a borrower's activities with and 
without a loan, other things being equal. The hypothetical 
information shown in Table 1 illustrates additionality. The 
table is divided into two parts and presents, in highly 
simplified form, the sources and uses of liquidity by a farm 
household over a period of time. It shows the sources and 
uses of liquidity both with and without a new formal loan. 
The table shows that, when given access to a formal loan of 
$1,000, the household will expend an equivalent amount on 
the purchase of a new capital input such as a tractor. If 
the household had not planned to allocate any of its 
liquidity to the purchase of the tractor in the absence of 
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TABLE 1 
SOURCES AND USES OF LIQUIDITY 
IN A FARM HOUSEHOLD WITHOUT 
AND WITH A FORMAL LOAN 
Sources of Liquidity Uses of Liquidity 
Amounts $ Amounts $ 
No With No With 
Loan Loan Loan Loan 
1. Borrowed formal A. Capital purchases 0 1,000 
funds 0 1,000 
B. Non-capital input 
2. Borrowed informal purchases 2,000 2,000 
funds 1,000 1,000 
c. Buy non-productive 
3. OWned funds 1,000 1,000 assets 1,000 1,000 
4. Sale of assets 1,000 1,000 D. Other expenditures 4,000 4,000 
5. Other income 4,000 4,000 Total 7,000 8,000 
Total 7,000 8,000 
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a loan, and if an amount exactly equal to the value of the 
loan were expended on the tractor, one could say that the 
loan was associated with 100 percent additionality~ an 
additional amount equal to the value of the loan was 
expended on the activity specified in the loan documents 
over what the household would have spent on that activity 
without the loan. 
The example in Table 1 could be altered to represent a 
case where there was zero capital additionality from the use 
of a new formal loan. Because of fungibility the household 
may decide to borrow $1,000, state that the purpose is to 
buy a tractor, but instead divert the use of that additional 
liquidity to other expenditures such as increasing household 
consumption. This diversion, in most countries would be 
illegal, yet be very hard to control or detect where a large 
number of geographically disbursed borrowers are involved. 
Diversion is especially hard to detect when the borrower is 
involved in the activity funded by the loan prior to 
receiving the loan. That is, the borrower may already have 
several pieces of equipment similar to the one specified in 
the loan document. 
The borrower may also realize zero additionality 
through financial substitution. For example, the borrower 
may plan to buy a tractor for $1,000 with or without a loan. 
A loan of a thousand dollars to buy a tractor would simply 
add to the stock of funds that could be spent on other 
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household activities. If this additional liquidity were 
used to buy other productive inputs such as labor, there 
would be zero additionality in capital purchases, but 100 
percent additionality in the purchase of labor, an expen-
diture not authorized in the loan agreement. This financial 
substitution of uses of liquidity is perfectly legal and 
extremely costly for lenders to control in rural areas. 
Because of the large number of actors involved in formal 
rural financial markets, the geographic disbursion of 
lending activities, and the multiple sources and uses of 
liquidity in most borrowing firm-households, it is 
impossible for lenders to exercise a large measure of 
control over loan use. 
It would be undesirable if lenders were able to force 
substantial degrees of additionality on borrowers. Doing so 
would result in lenders forcing borrowers to do something 
that they would otherwise not do. Realizing 100 percent 
additionality would mean that, without a loan, borrowers 
were unwilling to put any of their liquidity into the acti-
vity specified in the loan contract. If borrowers are eco-
nomically rational, this would mean that they were forced to 
invest in an activity that they consider to be low on their 
list of expenditure alternatives. If this were the case, 
one should expect that rational borrowers would exercise a 
good deal of effort in diverting a major part of the 
13 
liquidity provided by the loan to other activities that were 
higher on their priority list of activities. 
At the same time, a large measure of financial substi-
tution would indicate that the lender was funding an acti-
vity that was quite high on the list of things that 
borrowers wanted to do, whether or not they received a loan. 
Under either the diversion or financial substitution case, 
the borrower would be diverting claims on resources to acti-
vities that were expected to give the borrower more satis-
faction or returns at the margin than the activity specified 
in the loan document. While an urban lender might be able 
to insure that most liquidity provided by a loan went into 
building a steel plant, and also expect that this resulted 
in a good deal more capital investment, the same measure of 
control does not exist in rural lending. 
The fungibility features of financial instruments can 
be only partially neutralized by granting loans in kind. 
Granting and repaying loans in kind may lend a stronger aura 
of loan-tying than granting loans via financial instruments. 
This is more shadow than reality, however. If farmers are 
forced to take a loan in kind, say in the form of sacks of 
fertilizer, they may find it in their best interest to sell 
the fertilizer in the grey or informal market and use the 
proceeds to buy other inputs or goods that bring more satis-
faction. Even in those cases where the loan in kind cannot 
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be resold (e.g. a tubewell, or a building) the loan may be 
associated with a large measure of financial substitution. 
Granting loans in kind reinstitutes barter and destroys 
the benefits of finance. In many cases granting loans in 
kind simply increases the lender's and borrower's transac-
tion costs of getting the combinations of inputs and con-
sumption goods that are most desirable to the borrower. 
Fortunately, the workings of informal markets largely 
neutralize the inefficient effects of loan tying on resource 
allocation. With the heterogeneity that exists in rural 
firms and regions, it is hard to see how credit planners in 
the capital city can tie loans to activities that have 
economic returns as high as those daily discovered by indi-
vidual producers-borrowers. 
Loan Concentration 
Recent research in several less developed countries has 
uncovered a close inverse relationship between the rate of 
interest charged on agricultural loans and the concentration 
of these loans in the hands of relatively few people. 
Gonzalez-Vega has termed this the "Iron Law of Interest Rate 
Restrictions": the lower the real rate of interest charged 
on loans, the more heavily concentrated will be the loan 
portfolio. He has also outlined the microeconomic forces 
that drive the financial intermediaries, be they private or 
government owned, to conform to this law. One might argue 
that these cheap loans tend to be concentrated in the hands 
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of borrowing firms that are more capital intensive, by their 
very nature, than are the firms that are rationed-out of the 
credit system by financial intermediaries. 
Research has shown that firms receiving a large amount 
of the cheap credit tend to be relatively large, are managed 
by people with extensive previous access to the financial 
system, and are individuals who often have political clout. 
These preferred borrowers tend to use machinery, have a good 
deal of assets tied up in buildings, irrigation, and other 
equipment that is typical of firms managed by absentee 
ownership. Labor services often makes up a relatively small 
part of the resource services used in these borrowing firms. 
One might argue that lending more funds to these capital 
intensive firms would distort the overall use of resources 
across firms (those with and without loans) in favor of 
capital. This might occur even though the capital intensive 
firms did not alter their factor proportions with the access 
to additional funds. 
If loans were heavily concentrated in the hands of 
capital intensive firms, one should expect the amount of 
capital used by these firms to increase because of the "loan 
volume" effect. Because of the previously discussed very 
weak effects of interest rates on the combinations of inputs 
that borrowers choose to use, one should not expect signifi-
cant distortions in factor use within individual borrowing 
firms. There is also no a priori reason to conclude that 
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higher interest rates, which forced lenders to more widely 
spread their loans, would cause previously credit-rationed 
borrowers to acquire capital inputs that are equal to, 
greater than, or less than the decrease in purchases of 
capital by large producers that now have less access to 
loans. 
One might also argue that it is easier for lenders to 
enforce tying when loans are concentrated in relatively 
large amounts. That is, it may be easier for a lender to 
closely monitor diversion and substitution of funds when 
only a relatively small number of rural borrowers receive 
most of the cheap credit. In evaluating this argument, one 
must remember that even when rural loans are concentrated 
in the hands of relatively few people, the lender may still 
be working with hundreds of widely disbursed borrowers. 
Also, these large borrowers typically have a broad range of 
economic activity that may include combinations of several 
farm firms, non-farm rural firms, and urban economic 
interests. 
Many of these large borrowers justify loans on the 
basis of adding capital inputs to an existing stock rather 
than doing something that is entirely new. These conditions 
allow borrowers to easily "funge" funds from one use to 
another, to divert funds from one firm or activity to 
another, and to substitute borrowed for owned funds. Large 
complex firms that receive the bulk of the rationed loans 
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likely have more latitude to exercise fungibility than do 
smaller, less complex firms that tend to be rationed out of 
the credit market when interest rates are low. Further, 
because these large borrowers are relatively well educated 
and economically sophisticated, it is unlikely that the 
lender can force them to acquire capital inputs that are 
inconsistent with the borrower's economic interests. 
Clearly, low interest rates force lenders to con-
centrate cheap loans in the hands of firms that are inclined 
to be capital intensive. It is much less clear whether the 
end result of this loan concentration is any significant 
change in factor-use proportions in agriculture over what 
would exist with higher interest rates. Fungibility likely 
neutralizes most potential distortions. 
More Significant Problems 
While difficult to prove empirically, it appears to us 
that interest rates on loans have, at most, a weak effect on 
borrowers' factor proportion decisions. The price of 
inputs, their expected yields, and the product prices that 
borrowers expect to receive are far more important deter-
minants of the combination of inputs producers choose to 
use. While factor proportions have received most of the 
casual attention paid to the adverse effects of low interest 
rates, recent research has shown that at least four other 
issues are much more important. These are (1) the impacts 
of low interest rates on income distributions, (2) on the 
18 
costs of financial intermediation, (3) on the willingness of 
people to save in financial form, and (4) on the strength 
and vitality of the financial system itself. 
Recent research in several countries is showing that 
negative real rates of interest, loan concentration, and in 
some cases substantial amounts of loan defaults in rural 
financial markets are resulting in large transfers of 
puchasing power to relatively wealthy borrowers through for-
mal financial markets (e.g. Adams and Tommy, Gonzalez-Vega, 
Vogel). In Brazil, Mexico, and India these yearly income 
transfers are measured in billions of dollars. In some 
countries, the workings of financial markets are having a 
stronger adverse impact on the distributions of income than 
are any other force. Very little has been said about this 
in the development literature; it deserves much more atten-
tion. 
Recent research has also shown that low interest rates 
may be causing major increases in costs that both lenders 
and borrowers experience in carrying out financial transac-
tions (Ahmed, Cuevas and Graham, Ladman, and Nyanin) • Low 
interest rates, especially when combined with large amounts 
of funds from governments or donor agencies, force lenders 
to ration and target loans in largely futile attempts to 
meet political objectives. This process forces many 
borrowers to incur additional loan transaction costs to gain 
access to the financial system, and also results in lenders 
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incurring more loan transaction costs in appearing to target 
loans. Inflated lender transaction costs are often a major 
factor undermining their financial integrity. Low interest 
rates on loans also force intermediaries to pay even lower 
rates on deposits. This makes it impossible for the inter-
mediary to mobilize significant amounts of private deposits, 
and forces the lender to be highly dependent on government 
and donor agencies for funds. This, in turn, makes the 
lender susceptible to political intrusions. It is difficult 
for the lender to refuse to make loans to influential 
borrowers who are judged to be unworthy of credit, using 
non-political criteria. Politics further impedes loan 
collection and encourages default. This undermines the 
financial intermediary's balance sheet and income statement 
and it also diverts scarce managerial time to stroking and 
responding to political powers and trying to collect bad 
debts. 
A properly functioning financial market should play an 
increasingly larger role in mobilizing private savings in a 
growing economy. Providing opportunities and incentives to 
save through financial markets can be a strong force in 
increasing a country's overall savings performance. In most 
low income countries financial markets play minor roles in 
providing these savings opportunities and incentives. Low 
nominal rates of interest combined with substantial amounts 
of inflation result in negative real incentives for those 
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who want to save in financial form, especially in rural 
areas. With the small volume of savings that is offered to 
financial intermediaries at these low rates, the inter-
mediary has little incentive to improve savings deposit ser-
vices. This is reflected in relatively large minimum 
balance requirements on savings accounts, awkward hours for 
withdrawing savings, and intermediaries who are unwilling to 
offer rural people any deposit facilities in their institu-
tions. Recent research on savings behavior in rural areas 
of low income countries shows there is a much larger, latent 
voluntary savings capacity there than has heretofore been 
thought (Adams; Ong, Adams and Singh; and Vogel). No one 
can measure the amount of consumption that has been 
encouraged by low interest rates and the lack of appropriate 
savings facilities in rural areas of low income countries. 
The amount, nevertheless, is likely a very large multiple of 
all of the foreign assistance provided to low income 
countries! 
It is time for more development economists to remove 
cataracts from their view of financial market operations. 
The very superficial attention that has been given in the 
past to how interest rates and the operations of financial 
markets affect factor proportions seems to us to be a minor 
issue compared to other, largely neglected, results of cheap 
credit policies in low income countries. 
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